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Abstract – U.S. unions have developed the instrument of strategic campaigns to overcome 
growing employer resistance and political hostility towards union organizing and bargaining. In 
recent years, campaigning unions have increasingly sought to leverage transnational linkages of 
target companies, including attempts to employ the support of unions in the company’s “home 
country.” I explore, firstly, why German unions have often encountered U.S. unions’ strategic 
campaigns in Germany with scepticism, and secondly, the circumstances under which German 
unions have been forthcoming with support despite their scepticism. Differences in industrial 
relations account for the scepticism of German unions regarding strategic campaigns. Four 
factors help explain under which circumstances German union support is forthcoming regard-
less of the scepticism: Political orientation, union strength, industry sector, and target com-
pany.
Strategische Kampagnen amerikanischer Gewerkschaften
gegen Transnationale Unternehmen in Deutschland 
Zusammenfassung – Gewerkschaften in den USA haben das Instrument der „strategischen 
Kampagne“ entwickelt, um den wachsenden Widerstand von Unternehmen und Politik gegen 
Organisierungsbemühungen und Tarifverhandlungen zu überwinden. In jüngerer Zeit versu-
chen US-Gewerkschaften zunehmend, transnationale Verbindungen der Zielunternehmen in 
den Kampagnen auszunutzen, einschließlich der Unterstützung von Gewerkschaften im 
„Heimatland“ der Unternehmen. Ich untersuche erstens, warum deutsche Gewerkschaften den 
amerikanischen strategischen Kampagnen oft skeptisch gegenüberstanden, und zweitens, unter 
welchen Bedingungen die Kampagnen trotz dieser Skepsis unterstützt wurden. Unterschiede in 
den Systemen industrieller Beziehungen erklären die grundlegende Skepsis deutscher Gewerk-
schaften in Bezug auf strategische Kampagnen. Vier Faktoren helfen zu erklären, wann die 
Kampagnen dennoch unterstützt wurden: Politische Ausrichtung, gewerkschaftliche Stärke, 
Branche und Zielunternehmen. 
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1. Introduction 
Unions are on the defensive in most countries. Observers generally agree that they 
need to increase their transnational activities and expand their “strategic domain” 
(Martin/Ross 1999) to be able to challenge the neo-liberal “new constitutionalism”
(Gill 1998) and shape the global governance of modern capitalism. 
Ultimately, the transnational activities of unions must be anchored in strength-
ened national positions – there is no conceivable scenario for unions to be successful 
“global players” without a strong base at the local level, at workplaces and in politics. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore innovative union strategies developed at the 
national level and designed to improve union political and bargaining power predomi-
nantly at that level, but including elements that may provide some potential for effec-
tive transnational union action. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, U.S. unions have developed the instrument of strate-
gic campaigns to overcome growing employer resistance and political hostility towards 
union organizing and bargaining. In recent years, campaigning unions have increas-
ingly sought to leverage transnational linkages of target companies, including attempts 
to employ the support of unions in the company’s “home country.” This support is 
crucial for the desired “boomerang effect” (Keck/Sikking 1998) of strengthening local 
actors by generating external pressure through allies abroad. 
After introductory paragraphs about, first, the concept of, and experience with, 
strategic campaigns in the U.S. and, second, the transnationalization of the strategic 
campaign, I will address two main questions. Firstly, on the basis of existing case stud-
ies and participant observation, I explore why German unions have often encountered 
U.S. unions’ strategic campaigns in Germany with skepticism. Secondly, I will discuss 
the circumstances under which German unions have been forthcoming with support 
despite their skepticism. Differences in industrial relations traditions account for much 
of the skepticism of German unions regarding strategic campaigns. While the coop-
erative features of German industrial relations, which currently provide potential cam-
paigning leverage, bias German unions against the more adversarial practices of 
American unions, the adversarial industrial relations system in the U.S. favors volun-
taristic union strategies focused on narrow campaign demands and biased against the 
establishment of stable inter-union networks. Four factors help explain under which 
circumstances German union support is forthcoming regardless of the skepticism: the 
political orientation of the respective union; union strength; industry sector; and target 
company. It is important to note that there was some German union support in every 
U.S. union strategic campaign. I aspire to shed some light on why there were different 
levels of support. I end with a paragraph on ongoing cross border learning processes 
in the context of transnational strategic campaigns. 
2. The U.S. experience with unions’ strategic campaigns 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, several innovative U.S. unions began applying strategies 
of the famous community organizer Saul Alinsky, especially his concept of power 
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structure research, to labour relations.1 The concept of “corporate campaigns,” so 
dubbed by Ray Rogers (at the time with ACTWU, a textile workers’ union which later 
merged with the ILGWU to form UNITE, today head of Corporate Campaigns Inc.), 
was developed to cope with the increasingly adverse legal and political climate and 
with growing employer resistance to union organizing and collective bargaining. 
Under U.S. labour law, employers have the right to permanently replace striking 
employees in case of economic strikes. Rarely used until the 1980s, this practice, and 
even more so, the threat of it, became common after President Ronald Reagan gave it 
quasi-official blessing by “permanently replacing,” i.e., in effect terminating, striking 
air traffic controllers in 1981.2 Collective bargaining and organizing have been im-
peded by this and other features of U.S. labour law, as well as by “union busting” 
consultants (cf. Levitt 1993), by the slow judicial process regarding remedies to em-
ployer unfair labour practices such as the illegal firing of union activists, and by the 
threat of, or execution of plant closings, made easier by the processes of economic 
liberalization (cf. Bronfenbrenner 2000). 
The new strategy focused on the company as a social institution, i.e., on the 
many relationships any company has with society at large, e.g., its customers, suppli-
ers, creditors, subsidiaries and/or parent company, its shareholders and board 
members, with various levels of government, with the communities it operates in 
etc. as well as on the “relationships of these relationships” (Banks 2005), in order to 
identify vulnerabilities of the target corporation and thus leverage for the union. In 
an early comparative study of ten “corporate campaigns,” written from a manage-
ment perspective and using game theoretical language, Charles Perry argued that 
campaigns were about unions’ “expanding the scope” of labour disputes and escalat-
ing the conflict, vertically by elevating the issues at hand to issues of principle and 
horizontally by identifying potential allies (Perry 1987). In addition to this “game of 
principle,” he described four additional strategic “games” that make up corporate 
campaigns: The “game of politics,” i.e., appeals to different levels of government; 
the “game of protest” (through stockholders, often against the corporate parent of 
the target company); the “game of pressure” (using consumer actions such as boy-
cotts); and the attempt of disturbing the target companies’ business relationships, 
which he called the “game of principal.” Initially, corporate campaigns and espe-
cially Ray Rogers’ campaigns often focused on strategies of “following the money,” 
i.e. the games of protest and principal. 
In a more recent study of corporate campaigns, again from a management per-
spective, Jarol Manheim argues that the “systematic exploitation of key stakeholder 
relationships (…) defines the corporate campaign.” “Corporate campaigns are always 
about power. (…) They are solidly based in sophisticated research – into the network 
of interests that sustain a corporation and give it power, into the public image of the 
corporation, into its strengths and vulnerabilities – but they are conducted not in an 
                                                          
1  To this day, Alinsky’s 1971 book “Rules for Radicals” is readily available in the U.S., even 
in the main bookstore chains. 
2  Unless an agreement is reached, permanently replaced employees will be placed on a 
“preferential hiring list” after the end of a strike, so technically they are not terminated. 
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ivory tower or a research institute, but in the real world of political and economic 
struggle” (Manheim 2001: VII-VIII). 
From a union perspective, the key is indeed to look for the target company’s vul-
nerabilities beyond the immediate domain of labour relations and the shop floor, and 
to exploit them strategically. There is no “magic bullet,” and the AFL-CIO’s Secretary 
Treasurer Richard Trumka has therefore aptly called the corporate campaign the 
“death of a thousand cuts” (quoted in Manheim 2001: V). While they were very con-
troversial at first, corporate campaigns today are a mainstream strategy of the U.S. 
labour movement. The AFL-CIO and many of its affiliated unions have established 
specialized strategic research departments, and for the affiliates of the new Change to 
Win Federation, corporate campaigns are at the very heart of their understanding of 
union activity (Greven 2006a). In order to avoid “pattern targeting,” i.e. the simple 
execution of a standard campaign game plan that can be easily deciphered by the tar-
get company, unions are generally following a multifaceted and creative approach, 
which is why the terminology has changed from “corporate campaigns” to “compre-
hensive,” “coordinated,” or “strategic” campaigns. I will use the latter term, because it 
best captures the key element of contemporary union campaigns in the U.S.: the strate-
gic application of research and action. 
Among the many important aspects of campaign strategy, three deserve particular 
attention in the context of our question about cross-border inter-union support: stra-
tegic research and planning, an effective media strategy, and escalation. In terms of 
research, the key for a campaigner is to know the industry in which the company op-
erates intimately, i.e., to think from the perspective of the company rather than from 
the union’s in order to identify key company vulnerabilities (Chu 1993). Through stra-
tegic research and planning, the transnational links of a target company – which are 
not always obvious – are brought into focus. Secondly, media strategy is to frame the 
issues of the campaign for targeted audiences in order to elevate them to issues of 
general concern (as noted above, Perry called this the “game of principle,” and em-
phasized its importance above all other “games”). According to Karen Keiser (1993), 
issues can be framed in a number of ways, using different but sometimes compatible 
scenarios: “David vs. Goliath,” “Social Justice,” “Political Clout,” “In Common 
Good,” “Strange Bedfellows,” “Betrayal.” If the media strategy includes attacks on the 
company in its home country, the generation of inter-union support may be impeded 
as the union may be under pressure to side with the company. Finally, a key part of 
devising a strategy is to develop a timetable of campaign events that allows the initia-
tor of the campaign, the union, to escalate pressure on the target company (or one of 
its relations) as needed. This escalation can exacerbate any existing scepticism regard-
ing adversarial strategies resulting from different industrial relations systems and or-
ganizational cultures. 
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3. The transnationalisation of unions’ strategic campaigns 
On balance, strategic campaigns have been a successful innovation of a U.S. labour 
movement in continuous overall decline.3 The best known example is the Justice for 
Janitors campaign by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), which in 
many cities has successfully overcome resistance to union organizing by putting union, 
community and political pressure not on the direct employers, the janitorial contrac-
tors, but on building owners and managers as well as tenants (Waldinger et al. 1998). 
In 2001, renowned British director Ken Loach turned the struggle of immigrant jani-
tors in Century City, Los Angeles, into his acclaimed if somewhat romanticized film 
“Bread and Roses.” 
While even some of the very early strategic campaigns had international elements, 
often orchestrated through Global Union Federations (GUFs) such as the Interna-
tional Chemical, Energy and Mine Workers Federation (ICEM), today transnationali-
sation is a standard feature of campaigns because more enterprises, including small 
and medium-sized, are engaged in international business activities.4 While transna-
tional business linkages offer additional leverage to the campaigning unions, resorting 
to transnational strategic campaigns is generally a sign of union weakness. At the local 
and national level, where union action has traditionally been focused, labour’s bargain-
ing and political leverage is eroding because increased liberalization of trade and capi-
tal transfer has generally created favourable conditions for business. Transnational 
enterprises (TNEs) “whipsaw” different localities, e.g., workplaces, sub-level govern-
ments, and nation-states, by using the threat or execution of their “exit option.” In 
contrast, unions do not have the capability to conduct cross-border bargaining or 
strikes, in part because there is no effective international labour rights regime to pro-
tect their transnational activities (cf. Greven/Scherrer 2005). It is no surprise, then, 
that most transnational campaigns have been initiated by particularly embattled labour 
movements such as the American and the Australian that seek to generate leverage 
beyond the domestic arena. 
In the literature on NGOs, this transnationalisation of advocacy work, i.e. local 
actors generating external pressure on their targets through the actions of their allies 
abroad, has been called the “boomerang effect” (Keck/Sikking 1998). While Dombois 
et al. (2003) are sceptical whether the “boomerang model” can be applied to labour 
issues because of the complexities of industrial relations systems, asymmetries of 
power and conflicts of interests in the context of competition, it seems clear that the 
exploitation of transnational linkages has the potential to generate additional leverage 
and thus to strengthen unions. 
                                                          
3  There have been several high-profile defeats, e.g., United Food and Commercial Workers 
(UFCW) Local P-9’s struggle against the food giant Hormel in 1985/86 (Green 1990). In 
many other cases, campaigns have been abandoned quickly and with little fanfare. 
4  Several of the Global Union Federations (GUFs, formerly known as International Trade 
Secretariats) have built up capacities to assist their member unions in transnational cam-
paigns (cf. Zinn 2000). 
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Most research on U.S. unions’ strategic campaigns has so far been in the form of 
case studies of individual campaigns (Banks 1998; Russo 1998; Juravich/Bronfen-
brenner 1999; Greven 2003; Brown/Chang 2004; Zinn 2000). The studies of Perry 
(1987) and Manheim (2001) identified core elements of strategic campaigns, and 
Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (2001) looked at several campaigns of one union, the 
United Steelworkers of America. In general, combinations of structural factors and 
union and employer tactics greatly influence the outcome of campaigns, but only 
Hickey (2002) compared first contract “comprehensive campaigns” at five multina-
tional corporations in order to identify common patterns of factors regarding union 
success: rank-and-file activism, strategic consideration of union strength in the indus-
try, and the level of employer resistance. 
In transnational strategic campaigns, the generation of support from unions in 
other countries, especially in the home country of the target company, is a key source 
of leverage as well as one of the most important challenges for the campaigning un-
ions. Several of the case studies have addressed the organization of inter-union coop-
eration and the variation of responses from international unions. For example, the 
United Steelworkers found it easier to work with, and generate leverage from unions 
in Switzerland and Germany than from unions in Japan (Bronfenbrenner/Juravich 
2001), and in Germany, they found it easier to work with the metalworkers’ union (IG 
Metall) than with the chemical workers’ union (IG BCE) (Greven 2003). No attempt 
has so far been made to draw general conclusions from these rather anecdotal find-
ings, and no attempt will be made in this paper to generalize insights gained from the 
small number of U.S. strategic campaigns in Germany. The aspiration is to narrow the 
range of possible avenues for further research regarding the conditions for inter-union 
cooperation and support in the context of transnational strategic campaigns by 
providing an overview and analysis of strategic campaigns in one country. 
The following campaigns were considered: Teamsters (IBT) against VW; United 
Steelworkers (USWA) against Continental General Tire; USWA against Titan; Hotel 
Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE) against Marriott; Union of Nee-
dletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) against Brylane (PPR); Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) against Osram (Siemens); United 
Autoworkers (UAW) against Chef Solutions (Lufthansa); UNITE-HERE against Gate 
Gourmet. Details regarding some of these campaigns can be found in case studies and 
reports (Banks 1998; Greven 2003; Raffo 2003; Kriszun 2004). My research is based 
on these studies and on participant observation of several campaigns as well as of 
international union conferences focused on the cross-border diffusion of labour 
movement strategies.5 The overview of strategic campaigns in Germany is not com-
plete, especially since some campaigns never go beyond the exploratory stage, and 
others are episodic and tend to quietly fade away when lacking success. 
                                                          
5  Part of the empirical research for this paper was conducted as participant observation in 
the German-American campaigner network OrKa (Organisierung & Kampagnen) which 
provides support for unions conducting strategic and organizing campaigns. I would like 
to express my gratitude to OrKa and especially Jeffrey Raffo. 
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4. U.S. unions’ strategic campaigns against transnational enterprises
in Germany 
When dealing with companies operating in Germany, and especially with those 
headquartered there, U.S. union campaigners can in most cases expect significant 
leverage from inter-union cooperation because of the German system of co-
determination. German works councils and employee representatives on company 
supervisory boards have unparalleled access to corporate information and decision-
making. While both union density (20-29% in 2003, cf. http://www.eiro.eurofound. 
eu.int/2004/03/update/tn0403105u.html) and union coverage (68% in West Ger-
many and 53% in East Germany in 2004; cf. the Tarifarchiv at www.boeckler.de) 
have been declining, German unions still wield considerable power, especially in 
larger enterprises. 
At the same time, German unions are often highly irritated by U.S. strategic cam-
paigns run in Germany, which they perceive to be overly aggressive. In some cases, 
the resulting unwillingness to challenge management on behalf of the campaigning 
union has in turn been a source of discontent for American campaigners. 
Why, then, is support forthcoming in some cases and not in others? I will first 
explore in more detail why German unions have often encountered U.S. unions’ stra-
tegic campaigns in Germany with scepticism, and secondly, address the circumstances 
under which German unions have been supportive despite their scepticism. 
4.1 Obstacles to inter-union cooperation in transnational campaigns 
There is a vast literature on obstacles to international labour solidarity, especially re-
garding conflicts of interests along the North-South divide (cf. Eder 2002). Material 
interests are at the heart of union activity, and in the context of a global capitalist 
economy, there is bound to be competition between unionised and non-union work-
places, as well as between different unionised workplaces. In fact, ongoing processes 
of liberalization, deregulation and privatisation have increased the commodification of 
labour and thus increased such competition dramatically (Silver 2003). Material con-
flicts of interests are exacerbated by legal and institutional obstacles to inter-union 
cooperation such as different national labour law regimes and widespread regulations 
against sympathy strikes, by cultural and language barriers, and by different labour 
movement strategies regarding globalisation, which in part result from institutional 
and cultural differences (Greven 2006b). 
Specifically, there are two main reasons for the distrust of German unions regard-
ing U.S. unions’ strategic campaigns. Firstly, the cooperative features of German in-
dustrial relations, which currently provide potential campaigning, leverage bias Ger-
man unions against the more adversarial practices of American unions. Works coun-
cils and employee representatives on supervisory councils are legally required to work 
on behalf of the company – which is not to say that these requirements fully deter-
mine their actions. In addition, core sectors of the German economy are oriented 
towards export, and thus focus on international competitiveness. Consequently, Ger-
man unions often engage in productivity and competitiveness coalitions with man-
agement, and extend this micro-corporatism to their transnational strategies as well 
(ibid.). They prefer stable networks and institution-building (e.g. European and World 
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works councils, and so called International Framework Agreements with TNEs) 
rather than adversarial strategies. While these features of “social partnership” are be-
coming increasingly unstable, they still greatly influence German union policy. 
Secondly, the adversarial industrial relations system in the U.S. favours voluntaris-
tic union strategies focused on narrow campaign demands and biased against the es-
tablishment of stable inter-union networks. U.S. union campaigns usually focus on 
neutrality agreements in organizing (to prevent aggressive anti-union campaigning by 
the target company) and on wages and working conditions in contract campaigns, and 
this exclusive concept of solidarity is in stark contrast to the German unions’ corpora-
tist traditions, which induce them to focus their campaigns on broader demands be-
yond the interests of the union membership. More importantly, the requests for sup-
port often come ad hoc and at the last minute (“phone call solidarity”). The expecta-
tion that German unions will be able to take care of any problem with a German-
based company likely reflects the perception of their institutional prowess (as well as 
German unions’ expressions of superiority). However, it is certainly difficult to re-
spond to an emergency without previously established inter-union structures of coop-
eration.
Many German unionists also wonder whether strategic campaigns are not simply 
“one-way-solidarity” (“Einbahnstraßensolidarität,” as one unionist put it). Often, U.S. 
unions appear unwilling to challenge corporations on behalf of others when they have 
good labour relations, which could be leveraged. There have, however, not been many 
such requests for support, and some U.S. campaigning unions, in particular SEIU, 
have recently begun to form long-term international alliances in the context of strate-
gically organizing campaigns concerning transnational employers that may allow for 
continued reciprocity (see below). 
The tension between U.S. and German unions can be better understood by look-
ing at a 1999 strategic campaign involving the German tire maker Continental AG, the 
German chemical workers’ union IG BCE (Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, 
Energie), and the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) (cf. Greven 2003). In 
1999, the USWA conducted a strategic campaign against Continental, whose U.S. 
subsidiary General Tire in Charlotte, North Carolina, had rejected the union’s bargain-
ing demands and hired replacements for the striking workers. The USWA found it 
difficult to work with the IG BCE, Continental’s primary union in Germany. Not 
once were USWA delegations able to speak directly with German Continental workers 
and works council members (who were reported to be unsupportive of the campaign), 
except with those sitting as employee representatives on the company’s supervisory 
board, who were deeply committed to the established practices of co-determination 
(‘Mitbestimmung’) and social partnership. Their legal double-bind as representatives 
of the workers as well as of the company and, more importantly, the cooperative ori-
entation of the IG BCE led them to be highly sceptical of confrontational tactics such 
as challenges at the company’s annual shareholder meeting. 
When the German media picked up on disagreements about strategy between the 
unions, IG BCE president Hubertus Schmoldt went as far as to publicly call the 
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USWA’s adversarial tactics “not helpful” (Die Welt, July 28, 1999).6 But while the 
IGBCE did very little to publicly support the Steelworkers, the constant pressure on 
the company meant pressure on the union as well. The German media was reporting 
heavily on the dispute and the campaign, and the IG BCE wanted the problem to go 
away. In the end, the IG BCE did use established channels of co-determination to 
help facilitate an agreement, e.g., an informal high-level meeting was arranged shortly 
after the company’s annual shareholder meeting that helped to re-start the suspended 
bargaining sessions. The dispute was settled eventually (for a number of different 
reasons), but the IG BCE’s irritation remained strong. Rumours have persisted that no 
support would be forthcoming in future disputes.7
This may not be entirely voluntary, as the IG BCE’s position at Continental has 
been considerably weakened, at least regarding the tire making business. It is some-
what ironic that IG BCE, which has repeatedly expressed distrust towards American 
campaigning unions, currently suffers the probable defeat of the dominant German 
union strategy concerning globalisation, i.e. micro-corporatist productivity and com-
petitiveness alliances. In early 2006, Continental’s management unilaterally decided 
that the concessions agreed to by the works council and the union less than a year 
before would not suffice to keep any tire production in Germany, regardless of its 
profitability. All tire-making facilities in Germany would be closed and moved to 
Eastern Europe. For the first time, the management of a major German company had 
decided not to honour an agreement negotiated in the spirit of social partnership. 
While the IG BCE – which has generally been supportive of Continental’s busi-
ness strategy of moving from the production of tires to becoming a high-end automo-
tive supplier – and management subsequently agreed to a compromise involving some 
immediate job cuts and a delay of the plant closing until 2007, the larger context of 
this serious blow to competitiveness alliances is the erosion – or at least serious weak-
ening – of the German system of industrial relations (cf. Fichter 2005). This erosion 
may lead German unions and works councils to rethink their dominant strategies in 
dealing with globalisation. Competitiveness alliances are an expression of cooperative 
and trust-based relations in the context of social partnership. Critics have long pointed 
out that such strategies can amount to “wild cat cooperation” with management, un-
dermining broad-based rights and standards. The focus on competitiveness, however, 
arises from the strong export orientation of the core German industries, which are at 
the same time the industrial unions’ strongholds. While there has been some criticism 
of the German “neo-Mercantilist” strategy including calls on the unions to rethink 
                                                          
6  IG BCE’s predecessor, the IG Chemie (the chemical workers’ union, which merged with 
the mining workers’ union), was even more reluctant to support a campaign of the Oil, 
Chemical, and Atomic Workers (OCAW), since merged with the Paper Workers union to 
form PACE, against the German chemical company BASF in 1984 (La Botz 1991). As 
part of the campaign, OCAW highlighted BASF’s predecessor IG Farben’s role in the 
Nazi economy. This aggressive tactic irritated IG Chemie representatives greatly (Perry 
1987).
7  The relationship between the unions is put to the test at the time of this writing as the 
USWA is once again involved in a dispute with Continental General Tire. 
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their complicity in it (Beck 2005), for now it seems unlikely that German industrial 
unions will refocus on the domestic economy and mount an offensive against conces-
sion bargaining. 
4.2 Explaining union support in transnational strategic campaigns 
While the differences between the American and German industrial relations tradi-
tions go a long way to explain the general distrust towards confrontational tactics such 
as strategic campaigns, they do not predetermine German unions’ behaviour when 
asked for support. In fact, German unions have generally been at least somewhat sup-
portive of strategic campaigns, and outright hostility towards the campaigning unions 
is extremely rare. Based on the limited evidence provided by strategic campaigns con-
ducted in Germany since the 1990s, four tentative observations can be made regarding 
the likelihood of German union support. Firstly, political orientation of the union at 
various levels plays a key role. Generally, the more “left” a union entity is, the more 
“internationalist” and supportive of a strategic campaign it will be. Secondly, the level 
of support is also influenced by union strength. This factor, however, is more ambiva-
lent then the first. It seems that German unions are more likely to support U.S. strate-
gic campaigns if they have recently come under increasing pressure themselves. 
Thirdly, international solidarity is easier for unions operating in the service sector, 
because they are not faced with as much direct or indirect competition between each 
other’s as unions in the manufacturing sector. Finally, it seems to be more difficult to 
generate support if the ultimate target company is German-owned, i.e. if the campaign 
in Germany is a direct attack rather than the attempt to leverage the relationships of a 
company.
Political orientation of the union 
In the above mentioned case of the USWA’s Continental General Tire campaign, e.g., 
the Steelworkers worked much better with the German metalworkers’ union IG Met-
all, which represents workers at a company then newly acquired by Continental. In 
German union politics, the IG Metall is considered a fairly left-wing union with links 
to traditional labour-friendly Social Democrats (SPD), while the IG BCE is considered 
to be more moderate, with links to so called “modernizers” within the Social Democ-
rats.8 Then-IG Metall president Klaus Zwickel wrote to then-USWA president George 
Becker that “Continental’s behaviour in the U.S. is unbecoming of a company that, in 
Germany, adheres to the principles of social partnership,” a phrase which was used 
widely in the campaign because it captured in a nutshell the expectation that the expo-
sure of a company double standard could be leveraged to win the “game of principle.” 
Previously, the IG Metall had proved to be supportive of a successful 1994 
Teamsters’ strategic campaign regarding a dispute involving VW employees in the 
Wilmington, Delaware, port (cf. Banks 1998). The German service sector union ver.di 
(Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft) is also considered a politically progressive 
                                                          
8  There is also more support for the new “Left Party” from within the IG Metall. The post-
communist party PDS is in the process of merging with the WASG, a party that formed 
to the left of the SPD in protest of welfare reforms. WASG’s membership consists largely 
of union members and staff who have become disillusioned with the SPD. 
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union. Ver.di’s president Frank Bsirske is a strong advocate of adopting more aggres-
sive and creative union strategies (cf. Bsirkse 2005). The union has been supportive of 
U.S. strategic campaigns, e.g. in the case of the U.S. textile workers’ union UNITE’s 
campaign against the catalogue clothing company Brylane in 2003 (Raffo 2003; 
Kriszun 2004).9 UNITE was trying to organize workers at an Indiana distribution 
centre of Brylane, which is owned by the French conglomerate Pinault Printemps 
Redoute (PPR). While the main international campaign activity naturally took place in 
France (involving, for the first time in history, cooperation between the traditionally 
anti-communist AFL-CIO and the communist French union CGT), representatives of 
ver.di were instrumental in initiating actions against Gucci designer stores in Germany 
– also a PPR subsidiary and selected as an indirect target because of its high visibility 
and stake in an untarnished corporate image. 
These findings regarding the importance of unions’ political positions are hardly 
surprising, as politics heavily influence the extent of internationalism in other arenas 
of union activity such as European Works Councils (cf. Hürtgen 2003). 
Union strength 
In more ambivalent ways, the level of support that German unions provide for U.S. 
strategic campaigns is also influenced by the relative strength of German unions. It 
seems that German unions are more likely to support U.S. strategic campaigns, and 
even begin to take an interest in adopting some U.S. strategies, if they have come un-
der increasing pressure themselves recently. While only some of the unions that 
formed the service sector union ver.di were open to U.S. strategies prior to the merger 
(in particular Handel Banken Versicherungen, the union in retail, banking and insur-
ance, which started to adopt U.S. campaign techniques in the mid-1990s, cf. Wohland 
1998), the fact that the merged union continues to lose membership has increased 
interest towards U.S. union strategies and alliances with U.S. unions. I will further 
explore these ongoing cross-border learning processes below. 
At the same time, union weakness can play out in different ways. When the 
United Autoworkers (UAW) requested support from ver.di for an organizing drive at 
Chef Solutions in Connecticut, a Lufthansa-subsidiary which makes bread for the 
Lufthansa-owned airline-caterer Sky Chefs, there was great reluctance (also, once 
again, the call for support came rather late). Ver.di President Frank Bsirske, a union 
member of the Lufthansa supervisory board, was under pressure from shareholders 
because of his support of a costly strike at the Frankfurt airport. This case is a good 
illustration of the legal double bind of employee representatives on German supervi-
sory boards. Rather than use the case of the UAW organizing campaign to illustrate 
the necessity and legitimacy of union action (there had been cases of sexual and other 
harassment of the mostly female immigrant workers at the Connecticut bakery), Bsir-
ske preferred to not further agitate the shareholders, even though they cannot vote 
him out. 
                                                          
9  UNITE has since merged with the union of hotel and restaurant employees, HERE. 
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Industry sector 
German unions operating in the service sector are not as invested in the above-
mentioned neo-Mercantilist competitiveness agenda as industrial unions and therefore 
not faced with as much direct or indirect competition with each other as unions in the 
manufacturing sector. Also, the campaigns in the American service sector are mostly 
organizing rather than bargaining campaigns, so that there is less concern about in-
creasing the costs of a German company’s foreign operation (which appears to have 
been one of the concerns of the IG BCE in the case of the campaign against General 
Tire, see above). In addition, it is the U.S. service sector unions, in particular SEIU 
and UNITE-HERE, that are offering more long-time cooperation and reciprocity in 
campaigns, thus recognizing the legitimacy of the above-mentioned German critique 
of “one-way solidarity” (see below). 
Target company 
Finally, obtaining German union support seems to be somewhat easier if the ultimate 
target of the strategic campaign is not a German-owned company. For ver.di, support 
in the campaign involving Gucci stores was more readily available than in the case of 
Lufthansa. Even the IG Metall, while supportive in the campaign against VW in 
Delaware and in the campaign against Continental (which is predominantly organized 
by the IG BCE), had more difficulty in the campaign by the International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) to organize workers at an Osram facility in Ken-
tucky that attempted to leverage the company’s link with Siemens. Once again, how-
ever, this latter campaign lacked strategic preparation and focus. 
5. Cross-border learning processes 
If unions are to pursue transnational strategies effectively, they must be sensitive to 
these factors and to the national systems of industrial relations that they reflect.10 Ad-
versarial strategies based on the voluntaristic U.S. tradition such as strategic campaigns 
are effective in conflict situations, but may be too narrow and exclusive and thus not 
immediately suited for the building of stable networks. In contrast, network-building 
is the strength of approaches based on the cooperative German tradition, including 
such instruments as European and World Works Councils and International Frame-
work Agreements with TNEs (Müller et al. 2003; Müller et al. 2006), but these strate-
gies have not yet been effective in organizing cross-border collective action in conflict 
situations. Ultimately, however, the credibility of unions in cooperative institutional 
arrangements rests on their capacity to mount such collective contentious action, and 
this is why it is likely that German unions will become more interested in adversarial 
tactics such as strategic campaigns since the established Fordist institutions and social 
partnership traditions of the German industrial relations system are eroding. 
In fact, considerable cross-border learning of union strategies is already under-
way, in particular regarding the U.S. “organizing model,” i.e. the re-focusing of all 
union activities from the servicing of the existing membership to the aggressive orga-
                                                          
10  Transnational union strategies also vary in important ways between different industries 
(cf. Anner et al. 2006).
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nizing of new members, including some elements of strategic campaigning.11 The 
organizing model was first adopted by unions in Australia and the UK. In Germany, 
the academic and union reception was rather critical at first – again reflecting the dis-
trust of more adversarial tactics – but has become more positive recently (Frege 2000; 
Meyer 2002; Behrens 2005).
There has been much less academic and union discourse on U.S. strategic cam-
paigns (Dribbusch 1998; Greven 2001). On the margins of the German labour move-
ment, however, experiments with strategic campaigns were made as early as the mid-
1990s. In 1994 and 1995, a successful regional campaign against one of Germany’s 
largest drugstore chains, Schlecker, to establish works councils was organized by 
Handel Banken Versicherungen (hbv), which later became one of the unions to merge 
into ver.di (Huhn 2001). The campaign resulted in considerable membership growth 
for the union.12
The interest in strategic campaigns has grown within ver.di. Ver.di staff learnt 
about the new tactics first-hand in the context of SEIU and UNITE-HERE organiz-
ing campaigns and when they returned, they started to lobby within the organization 
to invest in campaigns (cf. Schreieder 2005). A newly established campaign fund is 
currently financing a nation-wide campaign against the giant discounter chain Lidl to 
establish works councils against severe company resistance (cf. Schwetz 2005). Several 
conferences on organizing and campaigning have taken place, organized by ver.di 
and/or the campaigner network OrKa, always with participation of American union-
ists (cf. www.neverworkalone.org).13
                                                          
11  There is considerable debate in the U.S. regarding the “organizing model,” especially in 
the context of the recent split of the labour movement (cf. Greven 2006a). The organiz-
ing successes of the unions of the new Change to Win Federation are rightfully hailed be-
cause they have reached new immigrants, women and youth. The failure to do so signifi-
cantly crippled a divisive and fragmented U.S. labour movement in the past, and SEIU 
and others certainly deserve credit. But I believe Ruth Milkman (2006) misses the point 
when she argues that it is the organizing tradition of the American Federation of Labor, 
with its occupational and local focus, that explains the success of SEIU and others. In the 
context of globalization, it is simply easier to organize the relatively immobile service 
sector, especially when focused on local markets where labour can effectively be taken 
out of of competition. The U.S. labour movement runs the risk of repeating a differ-
ent past failure: In the late 19th and early 20th century, it failed to merge the defensive 
struggle of craft unions against deskilling and Taylorism with the dynamic industrial 
organizing of non-skilled immigrant workers (Davis 1986). Now it must find ways to 
unite the defensive struggle of industrial unions in manufacturing with the new dynamism 
of organizing in service sector. 
12  In Germany, individual union membership is possible but not necessary to receive the 
benefits of a bargaining agreement, as those companies bound by an agreement will uni-
laterally extend its terms to all employees. 
13  The German construction workers union IG BAU has also shown interest and its presi-
dent even talked about introducing “American-style rapid-reaction forces.” IG BAU or-
ganizes the building services that in the U.S. are organized by SEIU, but it is unclear 
whether new tactics are going to be introduced across the board. 
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In the recent academic debate, Renneberg (2005) enthusiastically advocated the 
adoption of strategic campaigns from a participatory point of view, i.e. concerning the 
possibilities for rank-and-file participation. This is in contrast to criticisms sometimes 
raised in the U.S. about the top-down and non-transparent nature of campaign deci-
sion-making and the rather tactical participation of the membership. Similar criticisms 
have been raised against the adoption of the “organizing model” in the UK. Heery et 
al. (2000) called it “managed activism.” This is certainly a danger in Germany as well; 
there is already some debate to focus merely on membership recruitment. If cam-
paigns fail to meet benchmarks regarding new membership, the new tactics can be 
discredited. In any event, serious transfer problems remain and are visible in ongoing 
campaigns.
One can expect that German unions engaged in strategy transfers from the U.S. 
will be more willing to support American unions’ campaigns. They will, however, 
likely take great care not to unduly jeopardize remaining social partnership elements of 
German industrial relations. In order to overcome the distrust towards adversarial 
tactics and to generate support from German unions, American campaigners will thus 
have to take a complex set of expectations and objectives into account. Ultimately, a 
combination of the U.S. and German key strategies is called for: The establishment of 
stable inter-union networks, armed with the willingness and ability to conduct effec-
tive strategic campaigns, using all available leverage. 
Interestingly, the increased interest in U.S. organizing and campaigning tactics on 
the part of German unions coincides with an increased interest of U.S. campaigning 
unions, in particular SEIU and UNITE-HERE, to conduct more cooperative interna-
tional campaigns and to build stable inter-union networks around those campaigns.14
Since 2004, SEIU has a permanent representative at Union Network International
(UNI), the GUF for the service sector, and in 2005 the union established a global 
team that operates in Poland, the UK, the Netherlands, and in Germany, to name only 
the European countries. Network-building and cooperative campaigns to organize 
workers in the building services and security industries are well underway. E.g., ver.di 
Hamburg is undertaking a very ambitious program to train German union organizers 
(a new job description, as traditionally works councils have recruited new members) 
for a campaign in the security industry, and SEIU organizers have been instrumental 
in the effort. 
6. Conclusions 
German unions have often encountered U.S. unions’ strategic campaigns in Germany 
with scepticism because of differences in the industrial relations traditions. The coop-
erative features of German industrial relations, which currently provide potential cam-
paigning leverage, bias German unions against the more adversarial practices of 
American unions. At the same time, the adversarial industrial relations system in the 
U.S. favours voluntaristic strategies of U.S. unions biased towards narrow campaign 
demands and against the establishment of stable inter-union networks. But while these 
                                                          
14  Tactical and therefore episodic networks have often been part of transnational strategic 
campaigns (cf. Russo 1998). 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 13. Jg., Heft 3, 2006   267 
differences go a long way to explain the general distrust towards confrontational tac-
tics such as strategic campaigns, they do not predetermine German unions’ behaviour 
when asked for support. Four tentative observations were made regarding the likeli-
hood of German union support. Firstly, political orientation of the union at various 
levels plays a key role. Generally, the more “left” a union entity is, the more “interna-
tionalist” and supportive of a strategic campaign it will be. Secondly, the level of sup-
port is also influenced by union strength. German unions are more likely to support 
U.S. strategic campaigns if they have recently come under increasing pressure them-
selves. Thirdly, international solidarity is easier for unions operating in the service 
sector, because they are not faced with as much direct or indirect competition be-
tween each other as unions in the manufacturing sector. Finally, it seems to be more 
difficult to generate support if the ultimate target company is German-owned, i.e. if 
the campaign in Germany is a direct attack rather than the attempt to leverage the 
relationships of a company. 
If unions are to pursue transnational strategies effectively, i.e. if they want to gen-
erate additional leverage through the “boomerang effect,” they must be sensitive to 
the national systems of industrial relations and to the obstacles to inter-union coop-
eration they create. This requires considerable efforts in cross-border learning. In fact, 
such transnational learning processes are ongoing in both directions. First, as U.S. 
campaigning unions are becoming aware of the scepticism of unions in Germany and 
other countries with social partnership traditions regarding the adversarial and ad hoc 
nature of strategic campaigns, they are more willing to invest in stable inter-union 
networks and reciprocal solidarity. Secondly, as the credibility of unions in cooperative 
institutional arrangements rests on their capacity to mount collective contentious ac-
tion, German unions are becoming more interested in adversarial tactics such as stra-
tegic campaigns because of the erosion of established Fordist institutions and social 
partnership traditions. Ultimately, a combination of U.S. and German key union 
strategies is called for: The establishment of stable transnational inter-union networks, 
armed with the willingness and ability to conduct effective transnational strategic 
campaigns.
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